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ABSTRACT
This article examines the gender views of Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen, a
citizen of Turkey who has not only risen to global prominence since the early-
2000s, but also gained a reputation for having ‘progressive’ views on the status
of women in Islam. Considering Gülen’s writings on women’s identity, the
relationship between men and women, and the role of women in public life, the
article establishes that Gülen is more accurately depicted as deeply conservative
with respect to women’s rights and gender equality. Furthermore, it identifies
instances of tension between nature and nurture in Gülen’s conception of men
and women, and locates his insistence on women naturally being of a
subordinate kind within his sociopolitical project of creating an Islamic society.
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Introduction
This article examines the gender views of an Islamist preacher who has not
only risen to global prominence since the early-2000s, but also gained a repu-
tation for having ‘progressive’ views on the status of women in Islam. Fethul-
lah Gülen, born in the village of Korucuk near Erzurum in eastern Turkey in
1941, has been residing at the Golden GenerationWorship and Retreat Center
in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, since 1999. He was raised in a deeply religious
family, received little formal education but extensive religious training, was
first appointed as a state-salaried preacher in Edirne in 1959 and worked as
preacher and Quran teacher in various cities in western Turkey until taking
a permanent leave of absence in 1981. By that time, Gülen had attracted
quite a following in Turkey, and what is known today as the Gülen or
Hizmet (religious service) movement was nurtured into being at the time
when he worked at the Kestanepazarı Quranic School in Izmir (1966–71).
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Based on deep dissatisfaction with a ‘society gone astray’ due to Western
influence, and inspired by Sunni Islamic thought1 and Turko-Ottoman
nationalism, Gülen initiated his project of fostering a ‘golden generation’ of
‘soldiers of God’ dedicated to ‘save the world’ in the name of Islam.2
Towards this end, he established reading circles, summer camps and collective
homes for young male students, whom he subsequently encouraged to
become teachers in the dual sense of working in educational institutions
and representing Islam through their own examples. His sermons were
recorded and widely circulated, and in response to opportunities created by
the military coup d’état in 1980 – namely, the military rulers’ embrace of
both the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’3 and neoliberal economic policies – he
encouraged his followers and merchant supporters to channel resources
into private education and media as means through which to increase the
Islamic consciousness of individuals and society at large.
These activities were initially limited to Turkey, but the Gülen movement
expanded into the Turkic parts of Central Asia and the Balkans after the end
of the Cold War, and has now a worldwide presence through an extensive
network of business corporations, educational institutions, charity organiz-
ations, dialogue or interfaith institutes, and media institutions. As of today,
Gülen is considered to be not only ‘one of the most influential men in
Turkey,’4 but also ‘a major figure in defining the contemporary global
Islamic experience’ and ‘one of the most influential Muslim scholars in the
world.’5 Furthermore, his community of followers is claimed by some to be
‘the world’s most influential Islamic movement.’6 The influence of Gülen fol-
lowers has clearly been the greatest in Turkey, though the movement’s pos-
ition is now very uncertain due to its fallout with the Islamic-conservative
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which has gov-
erned Turkey since 2002.7 Leaving aside a whole series of controversies related
to Gülen and his movement, this article focuses specifically on women’s rights
and gender equality.
While critics and sympathizers alike tend to agree that gender relations
within the Gülen movement are fraught with patriarchy – this, with reference
to the practice of strict gender segregation, the tendency for wives and daugh-
ters to be confined to the private sphere, and the absence of women in leader-
ship positions8 – it is common among scholars to argue that Gülen himself
has ‘progressive’ views on women and gender relations. With explicit refer-
ence to gender equality, Yavuz argues, ‘there is a gap between what Gülen
teaches and how quickly the community adopts his leadership,’ and that
Gülen ‘is more practical and progressive than his community.’9 Likewise,
Kurtz talks about a ‘contradiction between [Gülen’s] rhetoric and the prac-
tices of some of the followers,’10 while Çelik invokes the notion of ‘passive
resistance’ to account for the alleged gap between Gülen and his ‘progressive’
gender views on the one hand, and ‘the movement’s conservative participants’
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on the other.11 Aras and Caha argue more generally that Gülen has ‘progress-
ive views… [o]n the question of women rights,’12 and Andrea goes further by
declaring him a ‘feminist’ and ‘champion of women’s rights.’13
Such representations of Gülen’s gender views as seemingly equivalent to a
liberal conception of men and women having equal rights and opportunities
in society have thus far gone unchallenged, and the main purpose of this
article is to establish that Gülen is more accurately conceived of as a champion
of patriarchy understood simply as a social system characterized by male
domination.14 While the first section outlines what is currently the most com-
prehensive positive assessment of Gülen’s gender views, the three following
ones counter such accounts through discussions of his views on women’s
identity, the relationship between men and women, and the role of women
in public life. Together, these sections make it clear that Gülen is prescribing
a traditional division of labor based on an understanding that women are
essentially different from and inferior to men. The fifth section engages
with instances of tension between nature and nurture in Gülen’s conception
of men and women, and his insistence on women naturally being of a subor-
dinate kind is subsequently positioned within his sociopolitical project of
creating an Islamic society. Overall, the article concludes that Gülen is but
a very conservative man of religion with respect to women’s rights and
gender equality.
Gülen as a ‘champion of women’s rights’
Andrea’s engagement with Gülen’s gender views is part of a ‘dialogic analysis’
in which ‘[his] responses to questions about women and their rights from an
Islamic perspective’ is considered in relation to Lady Mary Wortley Monta-
gu’s ‘perception of Muslim women’s rights during her travels throughout
the Ottoman Empire’ early in the eighteenth century.15 The dialogic com-
ponent aside, this section focuses on Andrea’s assessment of ‘articles and
interviews translated from Turkish to English drawn from archives on
[Gülen’s] website and from published collections of his writings.’16 In this
connection, she begins with a discussion of Gülen’s essay ‘Women,’17 first
published in Turkish in 1988. Given its concern with ‘women’s traditional
position as the first educators of their children and as those charged with
‘establish[ing] order, peace, and harmony in the home,’ Andrea argues,
‘Gülen’s stance regarding women’s roles outside the home remains ambigu-
ous,’ and that the essay:
beg questions as to what degree does Gülen support [the] resurgent movement
[of women claiming their ‘Islamic rights’ to be educated and to earn a living]
and to what degree does he adhere to traditions that would confine women
to the home.18
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In time, the ambiguity in question is seen to have disappeared, and the follow-
ing quote from an interview of 2005 is taken to ‘synthesize [Gülen’s] views on
women’s rights articulated over a decade and a half in print:’19
Woman is equal to man in the rights of freedom of religion, freedom of
expression, freedom to live a decent life, and freedom of finance. Equality
before the law, just treatment, marriage and founding a family life, personal
life, privacy and protection are all among the rights of women. Her possessions,
life and dignity are assured like that of men.20
Before reaching this point, Andrea highlights several things in Gülen’s post-
1990 writings and interviews that she thinks clarify his position on the role of
women in society. First, she draws attention to Gülen’s criticism of particular
interpretations of Islam. This concerns women praying in mosques, where
Gülen has reminded people that ‘women and men prayed together in
mosques during the time of the Prophet,’ and argued that ‘if they would
like to, they should not be banned if there is no justifiable reason for
banning them.’21 It also concerns polygamy, where Gülen has stated that
‘there is no record in the Qur’an or the hadith that it’s sunna to marry
more than one woman by means of a religious marriage,’ and argued that
‘marrying just one woman is encouraged to the degree of being mandatory.’22
Lastly, it concerns covering of women, where Gülen has asserted that the
headscarf is ‘a matter of secondary importance’23 and that ‘[i]t’s against the
spirit of Islam to regard uncovered women as outside of religion.’24
Another point Andrea emphasizes is Gülen’s view that ‘restrictions on
women in Muslim communities…must be seen in light of customary prac-
tices and political agendas that are not necessarily Islamic.’25 Overall, there
are two dimensions to Gülen’s engagement with the association of women’s
oppression with Islam. First, he argues that Islam ‘saved women who were
exploited, enslaved, and regarded as second class in the darkness of the
pre-Islamic Age of Ignorance from the position of poor creatures and elevated
them to a new status as a blessed being.’26 Second, Gülen argues, ‘pre-Islamic
traditions in some societies and regions have been preserved, and Islam
should not be held responsible for any faults inherent in them.’27 More
specifically, he contends that ‘the lands into which Islam spread are in the
Arabian Peninsula; women are routinely oppressed in the Middle East and
Arab countries. Feudal and patriarchal traditions are being kept alive by
being practiced under the banner of Islam.28
Andrea also stresses that Gülen has ‘explicitly assert[ed] the fundamental
equality of males and females’ when stating that ‘we must not forget that
female lions are still lions.’29 Furthermore, she writes, while ‘Gülen acknowl-
edges potential differences between men and women,’ his position is that they
‘should not become grounds for hierarchy’ – constituting the basis for what
she refers to as his ‘model of equality in complementarity.’30 Finally,
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Andrea emphasizes that Gülen ‘does not promote excluding women from
specific roles.’31 In this connection, she makes specific reference to an inter-
view on ‘Women’s rights in Islam,’ and quotes most of the following passage:
The contribution of women in certain fields of life is not banned in Islam…
Women have indeed contributed in every field of life (throughout history).
For instance, they were allowed to participate in battles; their education was
not only desired, but also actively sought and encouraged. …Women can
assume any role. … the historical experience reveals that according to Abu
Hanifa women can even be judges…Women can be anything, a soldier or a
doctor.32
All of the above is seen to feed into the 2005 ‘synthesis’ of Gülen’s views on
women’s rights, and constitutes the basis for Andrea concluding that just as
it has been argued that Muhammad was a feminist due to his ‘immense
respect for women and unwavering commitment to their rights;’ Gülen is a
‘feminist’ and ‘champion of women’s rights by scrupulously following the
path of the Prophet.’33 Although Andrea’s narrative of Gülen’s gender
views having moved progressively from ambiguity to clarity might convince
uninformed readers, it simply does not stand up to a closer scrutiny of his
writings.
A woman’s ‘real identity’
With regards to the identity of women, Gülen has always been clear about it
being that of home-maker and social breeder. In the essay ‘Women,’ he begins
by stating that ‘[w]omen train and educate children, and establish order,
peace, and harmony in the home. They are the first teachers in the school
of humanity,’ he writes, concluding that ‘[a] woman whose heart is illumi-
nated with the light of faith and whose mind is enlightened with knowledge
and social breeding builds her home anew each day by adding new dimen-
sions of beauty to it.’34 The basis for these views is his foundational conception
of there being not ‘potential’ (as Andrea has it) but very real and significant
differences between men and women:
Men are physically stronger and more capable than women, and plainly consti-
tuted to strive and compete without needing to withdraw from the struggle. It is
different with women, because of their menstrual period [and] their necessary
confinement before and after childbirth.35
While Gülen’s focus is often on physical differences, he states elsewhere
that there are also ‘psychological differences’ – with women considered
to ‘have deeper emotions; they are more compassionate, more delicate,
more self-sacrificing’36 – as well as ‘spiritual’ differences.37 Dimensions of
difference aside, Gülen’s key point is that a ‘woman is a woman and a
man is a man,’38 and ‘[w]hile looking for a place for each gender in
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society, we should consider… innate differences.’39 This biological determi-
nistic reasoning is elaborated elsewhere as follows:
Both sexes are equipped according to the necessities of their duties; this is true
justice. Therefore, instead of studying men and women as if they were on equal
terms, we should evaluate women and men separately and according to their
own particular natures. Women have certain rights and duties based on the
nature of their creation.40
Being ‘created a magnificent example of affection with respect to her inner
faculties,’41 Gülen conceives of a woman as a ‘heroine of compassion’42
who ‘always stands up straight in the heart of her home and nourishes our
feelings with affection, mercy, and love,’43 and ‘conforms to her fate – be it
bitter or sweet – at peace with both joys and sorrows, without any expec-
tations in return.’44 ‘It is a great kindness and wisdom of God,’ Gülen
writes elsewhere:
that women have been equipped with such compassion when we consider that
they are in charge of bringing up children. … They are educators, teachers, and
the source of the family’s endurance and the peace of the home. Men are reas-
sured by them.45
In consequence, so-called innate differences are seen to produce a natural-
divine division of labor in which ‘[w]omen are responsible for domestic
work, whereas men are responsible for non-domestic work.’46 According
to Gülen, women’s position within this division of labor is very
honorable, and the homes that they make are portrayed as being of a
different world:
A house that contains an honourable, well-mannered woman loyal to her home
is a corner from Heaven. … Thanks to the good successors she raised and left
behind, the home of a spiritually mature woman constantly exudes a scent of
joy like an incense burner. The ‘heavenly’ home where this aroma ‘blows’ is
a garden of Paradise beyond description.47
Not only is home represented in the image of paradise, but Gülen’s ideal
woman is herself constituted as otherworldly. As stated in another essay: ‘A
woman who has found her match with respect to depth of soul and who
has quenched her thirst with her children is no different than the women
of Paradise.’48 In this essay, Gülen makes several references to the other-
worldly nature of a home made by the ‘perfect woman,’ whom he describes
as ‘a faultless projection of the beauties of paradise in homes.’49 Yet elsewhere,
he states that:
[m]others are beings that are oriented on the Hereafter in this world. … Their
faces are as otherworldly as the houris in Paradise, their looks are as profound
as those of the angels, and their feelings are as pure as that of any spiritual
being.50
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Otherworldly models aside, Gülen is very disturbed by women not conform-
ing to his conception of them as home-makers, and argues not merely that
‘[a]pproaches and ways outside of the framework of their creation make
[women] ugly and rough,’51 but that women adopting a ‘modern lifestyle’
represent violence against nature:
Today, the issue of gender has reached the point where some people refuse to
recognize the very real differences between men and women and claim that
they are alike and equal in all respects. Implementing these views has resulted
in the ‘modern’ lifestyle of women working outside the home, trying to ‘become
men,’ and thus losing their own identity. Family life has eroded, for children are
sent to daycare centers or boarding schools as parents are too busy, as ‘individ-
uals,’ to take proper care of them. This violence against nature and culture has
destroyed the home as a place of balance between authority and love, as a focus
of security and peace.52
Against this background, Gülen stresses the importance of a woman remain-
ing true to ‘her nature and disposition,’53 and his essay ‘Women’ includes
warnings in the form of a running contrast between the ideal woman who
‘gives importance to her decency, honor and virtue’ and creates ‘a healthy
home [and] a sound generation’ on the one hand, and ‘disreputable,’ ‘undigni-
fied’ and ‘dissolute’ women who ‘destroy existing homes’ and ‘pollute every
place [they] visit’ on the other.54 Undoubtedly, it is women not preserving
their decency whom Gülen dislikes the most,55 and this connects with a
theme running through much of his work – namely, that of women as temp-
tresses and ‘webs of the devil.’56 Although Gülen argues that both men and
women can be sources of mischief in relation to each other,57 men are con-
sidered to be ‘at greater risk than women and more liable to fall [because]
they often are attracted to women and follow their desire.’58 Accordingly,
women are depicted as posing an ever-present danger to both men and
society: ‘[p]ast nations and communities perished because of fitne’ or chaos
caused by women’s inherently seductive nature;59 men are under constant
threat by the presence of women in streets and marketplaces; and women
are waiting next to the bridge leading to paradise in a final attempt to trap
men.60 While Andrea might be correct in arguing that, Gülen rejects ‘the
patriarchal logic that men’s desire is women’s fault,’61 he subscribes to the
patriarchal logic that it is more common and seemingly natural for men to
be attracted to women, that men are less capable of controlling their sexual
desires, and that modesty is more important for women due to them repre-
senting a devil’s test to men.62
In concluding this section, it can be noted that the devil appears also else-
where in relevant parts of Gülen’s writings. In parallel to his conception of
homosexuality, he argues that ‘feminized men’ and ‘masculinized women’ are
the devil’s work.63 The reasoning informing this view is straightforward: Men
becoming like women and vice versa are contrary to nature; being contrary
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to the laws of nature, they are contrary to God’s creation; and any ‘attempt to
change creation and nature …must be rejected (mardud) as satanic.’64 Accord-
ing to Gülen, the feminization of men and masculinization of women is worse
than repositioning organs on the human body – exemplified with ‘placing ears
on kneecaps, nose on the belly, or eyes under the feet’65 – and men and women
taking on the characteristics of the other sex are cursed.66
The superiority of men ‘cannot be denied’
Given how human beings are seen as created in pairs, Gülen considers mar-
riage to be not merely ‘natural,’ but ‘a necessary condition of being a
human.’67 To avoid men and women becoming ‘outrageous’ and ‘miserable’
respectively,68 as well as seduced into illicit sexual relations, it is Gülen’s
view that boys and girls must get married, and he ascribes significant respon-
sibility to parents in arranging this.69 While recognizing that things created in
pairs can stand in an opposite or complementary relationship to each other,70
he emphasizes that men and women have complementary characteristics, and
‘[w]hen they come together, such characteristics allow them to establish a har-
monious family unit.’71 By necessity, this unit includes children as part of the
‘family trio,’72 because ‘marriage made for reasons other than bringing up new
generations is no more than temporary entertainment and adventure.’73
While Gülen states both that ‘the difference in the creation of women
should not lead men to feel superior,’ and that women and men are ‘the pro-
tector and guardian for one another,’74 he is absolutely clear about a family
needing a leader, and the husband being the leader. ‘In all circumstances,’
he argues, ‘members of the family should gather around a leader [and] take
this leader as the one to be consulted on all matters concerning the
family.’75 According to Gülen, ‘[s]uch an approach will support the idea of
obedience taking root in the family, as well as the foundation of unity and
order.’76 In a similar fashion, he has more recently stated that there has to
be one person making the final decision in order to have ‘stability and
order’ and ‘peace and happiness in the family.’77
Regarding the husband being the leader of the family, Gülen explicitly
states that ‘the superiority of men compared to women cannot be denied,’
and that ‘man [is] the leader at home.’78 For Gülen, this follows from the prin-
ciple of ‘reward in proportion to hardship,’79 and:
man is considered superior, as the one who can always be active in every field of
[social] life; who can supply finances for his family; who can face and counter
even the toughest of conditions; and who can provide food and clothing for his
children.’80
He stresses that the husband ‘has been assigned as the one to make the final
decision after consultations,’81 and next to the importance ascribed to
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motherhood, this granting of consultative-cum-secondary status to wives is
treated as a sign of the value ascribed to women in Islam.82 Gülen bases
this on the example of Muhammad consulting his wives: ‘In doing this, he
taught Muslim men an important social lesson: There is nothing wrong
with exchanging ideas with women on important matters, or on any
matters at all.’83
With regard to the hierarchical family order, Gülen quotes the hadith,
‘[e]ach of you is a shepherd, and each of you is responsible for your flock,’
and further specifying a ‘husband is a shepherd responsible for his family’
and a ‘woman is a shepherd responsible for her husband’s house.’84 According
to Gülen, ‘[a]ssigning qualified people to jobs or posts is a social trust,’85 and a
woman being responsible for ‘the administration of housework and protecting
the husband’s belongings, honor, and chastity’ is the centerpiece of her loyalty
to the husband.86 He stresses the significance of this on several occasions, and
makes the point as follows in the Turkish version of the essay ‘Women:’ ‘The
ornaments of a virtuous woman are her honor and decency, while her social
breeding and loyalty to her husband is that which should be appreciated and
complimented the most.’87
Concerning power relations within the family, Gülen ascribes to the
husband also the authority to guide and discipline the wife. The basis for
this is the view that women are born with certain weaknesses or deficiencies.
Being crooked like the rib bone from which Eve was created – a Biblical point
endorsing women’s ‘essential secondariness’88 – Gülen argues that a woman
must be corrected by the husband.89 Furthermore, in a commentary on
verse 34 of the Sura of Women, he writes that ‘[w]omen are at your disposal.
They do your work and sustain your lineage and you, as mentor, advise them
and work to help them rise to the high level of humanity.’90 While Gülen con-
siders guidance to be the preferred method of correcting ‘rebellious, arrogant
and disobedient’ women, he argues that when this does not help, the husband
should be strong-willed and prevent the wife from using her weapon of sexu-
ality and, if necessary, employ ‘gentle beating.’91 Despite Gülen’s recent criti-
cism of domestic violence,92 he clearly thinks it meaningful to distinguish
between a legitimate form of beating aimed at ‘educating’ the wife, and an ille-
gitimate form based on feelings of revenge, torture, suffering and cruelty.
Overall, Gülen’s conception of the relationship between men and women
rests to a large extent on a conservative-patriarchal reading of verse 34 of
the Sura of Women, and this embeds him in a long tradition of Muslim
men who have (ab)used it to justify women’s subordination to men.93
‘Women can assume any [public] role’ – but, but, but…
With respect to gender, the ambiguity in Gülen’s writings concerns the role of
women outside the domestic sphere. On the one hand, reminiscent of Nursi’s
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claim that ‘women left their homes and led mankind astray,’94 Gülen has
argued that women leaving their homes is a source of social disorder.95 On
the other hand, he has stated that overlove of home is dangerous for men
and women alike, and that nobody should stay at home only.96 While
Andrea takes some of Gülen’s recent statements to imply a carte blanche
for women to actually ‘assume any role’ or ‘be anything,’97 the following
quote constitutes a good point of departure for a more detailed discussion:
According to Islam, women’s role in this world is not only restricted to doing
the housework and raising children. In fact, as long as it does not conflict with
her primordial nature or with observing religious requirements, she is respon-
sible for carrying out the duties that befall her in every area of society and
making up for shortcomings where men fall short in social life.98
It follows that a woman’s role is first and foremost limited to home-making
and social breeding. While one could imagine women avoiding this
primary restriction on participation in social life by not getting married,
not having children or leaving children to the care of others, there is no
space for this in Gülen’s thinking. As mentioned earlier, he considers marriage
a necessity for being a human, and its purpose is to establish a family. Further-
more, he has long since criticized ‘Western hypocrisy’ as it concerns family
planning, arguing that Muslims should have many children, and approving
of contraception only in cases related to a woman’s health and ability to
provide Islamic training.99 Finally, Gülen disapproves of the ‘Western’ prac-
tice of children being placed in day-care centers and nurseries, because only a
mother can ‘provide the compassion that a child needs the most.’100
Public activities on the part of women are further restricted with reference
to their primordial nature and observance of religious requirements. Regard-
ing the latter, Gülen argues that when considering what women can do in
social life, ‘[t]he most important thing is to make sure that they can fulfill
their faith,’ adding that ‘[t]here may be some women who can fulfill their
faith while employed in the public service, while others at home may fail in
observing the faith fully.’101 In consequence, there is a clear warning that
the likelihood of women successfully fulfilling their faith is significantly
smaller when active in the public sphere. With regard to restrictions related
to women’s ‘primordial nature,’ the greatest clarity in Gülen’s writings con-
cerns differences related to biological reproduction and physical strength.
In connection with the former, Gülen argues that ‘[b]ecause of their menstrual
period [and] their necessary confinement before and after childbirth…
women [cannot] be available continually for public duties.’102 Rhetorically,
he asks ‘[h]ow could a mother with a baby in her lap lead and administer
armies, make life-and-death decisions, and sustain and prosecute a difficult
strategy against an enemy?’103 Irrespective of Gülen elsewhere stating that
‘[t]here is no reason to why a woman can’t be an administrator,’104 it
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follows from this reasoning and the more general language used in the
Turkish version that women are considered unsuitable for leadership
positions.105
Regarding physical strength, Gülen argues that ‘men are stronger than
women,’ and it is therefore ‘very difficult for a woman to do some of the
work that a man does.’106 In fact, whenever Gülen opens up space for
women being integrated in public life, he quickly closes it with reference to
‘physical conditions.’ For instance, when arguing that ‘[t]he contribution of
women in certain fields of life is not banned in Islam,’ he immediately quali-
fies this by adding ‘provided that physical conditions have been taken into
consideration and their working conditions are suitable.’107 Later in the
same interview, Gülen asks ‘should they be employed in heavy labor like
coal mines? Should it be compulsory for them to perform military service
like men? Should they be trained with heavy weapons?’108 While his immedi-
ate response is that nobody would disagree if it was ‘necessary and feasible,’ it
is clear that Gülen considers cases of necessity to be few and far between, and
that such activities are infeasible for women.
For Gülen, restricting what women can do is ‘an expression of Islam’s kind
approach towards women,’109 and he argues both that ‘offering a woman a job
that she cannot handle, or employing her in a job that it is not in her nature to
accomplish’ is ‘little more than the forceful seizure of the majority of her
rights,’110 and that ‘[i]f women are told to stop in certain situations [then]
this should not be understood as depriving a woman of her rights, but
rather of protecting her.’111 Such restrictions of women’s freedom to make
their own choices and decisions regarding what to do and not to do are in
accordance with a version of what Young refers to as the ‘logic of masculinist
protection’ – namely, one whereby women are subordinated as a result of men
seeking not to dominate women for the sake of their own pleasure or
enhancement, but to protect them from dangers.112 In Gülen’s writings,
this patriarchal logic extends further to include the need for women to be pro-
tected against men with a dominative masculinity and/or their own weak-
nesses. As noted in the Turkish version of the essay ‘Women:’
We say ‘watch that your skirts don’t get dusty.’ I do not know if you can under-
stand the extent of the necessity for women, who are the most precious things,
to be protected and watched over very carefully. …A woman is not a dirty
dish or worthless stone, and her place is not where dirty dishes or stones are.
She is a unique diamond and must always be protected in a diamond box
inlaid with mother of pearl.113
As the focus on various restrictions placed by Gülen on women’s role in
society has reproduced a full-fledged division of labor, with women ‘protected’
in homes conceived in paradisiacal terms, it makes sense to return to the
earlier quote and consider the statement that women are ‘responsible for
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carrying out the duties that befall her in every area of society and making up
for male shortcomings in social life.’114 In this connection, while Gülen’s pos-
ition on women’s domestic duties is absolutely clear, he hardly ever ascribes
public duties to women. The exception is the following specification of reli-
gious activities:
It is for sure that a woman should praise her home and take care of her children.
However, she also has certain responsibilities for social life besides not neglect-
ing her family. She has to attend social gatherings where conversations about
God takes place, she has to take part in discussions on religious and scholarly
issues, she has to do lessons with her friends and, meanwhile, she has to reflect
on solutions for common problems of social life, she has to think about these
issues as debated in related meetings and should use every opportunity to
serve the religion.115
What, then, about women being positively responsible for making up for
men’s shortcomings in social life? If these shortcomings are understood quan-
titatively, then the issue is simply that a shortage of men makes it necessary for
women to do public things that otherwise are men’s duty. In this connection,
it was mentioned above that Gülen is open to women being employed in
heavy labor, performing military service, and being trained with heavy
weapons if necessary, and he has elsewhere stated, ‘a woman – when it is
out of necessity – is ready to undertake any kind of mission and even go to
the frontline to combat.’116 Overall, Gülen refers here to exceptional con-
ditions of crisis and emergency, and generally considers women working
and earning money outside of home as signs of rebellion.117
If men’s shortcomings are understood qualitatively, then several lines of
reasoning are possible. First, given their duty to take care of a family finan-
cially, men can potentially be considered ill-suited for unpaid voluntary
work. Second, men can potentially be considered ill-suited for particular
social activities due to their ‘nature of creation.’ However, in contrast to his
reasoning along this line with regard to women, Gülen never applies it to
men. Third, men can potentially be regarded as unfit for social activities
that imply mixing with unrelated women. Given the importance ascribed to
gender segregation by his followers, it is surprising that Gülen has little to
say about this when reflecting on women’s role in social life. While he is
open to men and women praying together in mosques, this is the case only
as long as women pray behind men, and his justification is that ‘if a man
notices a beautiful woman… he cannot say that he did not feel anything. If
such a man says he did not, then I would tell him “Please, God sees, God
hears, please let’s not lie here”.’118 His reasoning here and many other
places implies an extreme sexualization of women – this, in that their
visible presence, even when dressed for prayer and inside of a mosque, is suf-
ficient for them to be treated as objects of male sexual desire – and this cannot
but influence his view on gender integration-versus-segregation in social life.
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In consequence, gender segregation must be assumed built into Gülen’s
concern with working conditions being suitable for women, and given how
the public sphere is constituted as being a male preserve, this implies yet
another restriction on women’s participation in public life. That said, a
concern with gender segregation can also open up pockets of female par-
ticipation by creating a need for women to interact with other women in
public life. In this connection, when Gülen refers to ‘Hanafi jurisprudence
[saying] that a woman can be a judge,’ he continues ‘[m]aybe some
women could explain certain matters more comfortably to a judge of
their own gender.’119 In parallel, Gülen has celebrated the Directorate of
Religious Affairs in Turkey for its ‘marvelous policy of recruiting female
officers in various departments so that women can comfortably ask for
information.’120 Overall, women guiding other women accords with
Gülen’s frequent references to the role played by Muhammad’s wives in
this respect.
Backtracking on a slippery slope from nature to nurture
While Gülen’s conception of women’s role in society is derived from claims
regarding innate differences between men and women, he provides some
clues as to the characteristics ascribed to men and women, respectively,
being more sociocultural and prescriptive than otherwise claimed.121 One
case in point concerns how Gülen portrays women in Turkey in terms other-
wise reserved for men when arguing that ‘because of old Turkish traditions,
women are strong, competitive, and function alongside men in social
life.’122 The context for this statement is Gülen’s distinction between ‘different
Muslim cultures and lifestyles,’123 and his argument that:
it was the Turks who understood [the Prophet] best. The value placed on
women in Anatolian Islam, the equal place of women in the Turkish tradition,
the motif of women who fight alongside men and share the throne with men,
these are elements of Turkish Islam.124
This links up with how Gülen elsewhere argues that women are indeed
capable of doing everything that men commonly do. In one essay, for
instance, Gülen initially stresses both that ‘a man is a glory with his faith,
bravery, resistance and readiness for battle’ and that ‘a woman… is very
different: faithful, delicate and fragile… a different kind of hero as a supporter
bolstering a man’s morale and a teacher for her children,’ before arguing that
‘a man can always support his wife in household-related tasks and a woman –
when it is out of necessity – is ready to undertake any kind of mission and
even go to the frontline to combat.’125 Although he quickly adds ‘in such a
case, what is one’s essential duty is secondary to the other,’126 the important
thing to note is that if women are capable of doing what men commonly do in
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cases of necessity, then they are overall much more capable that what Gülen
otherwise claims with reference to their primordial nature.
Another case in point concerns Gülen’s portrayal of the ‘golden generation’
that will ‘solve [humanity’s] accumulated problems’ through a ‘second revival’
of Islam.127 In a discussion on compassion, for instance, Gülen renders both
men and women meaningful in the image of ‘the mother:’
Compassion… is a manifestation of the godly virtues, heavenly breath, and a
further name for the warmth of all mothers. …A person whose heart beats
with the pulse of mercy is so full of compassion for others that he or she
approaches very gently all people and events. She or he embraces those in
misery like a compassionate mother taking her little ones into her bosom. He
or she constantly circles around those in dire need and protection like a
mother bird beating her wings to return to the nest to feed and protect her
chicks.128
What is noteworthy about this is that men are described in terms that Gülen
otherwise reserves for women. While this can seem to amount to a feminiza-
tion of men, it should rather be considered in relation to Gülen’s conception
of the ideal man possessing opposite attributes. When asked how it could be
that Muhammad ‘possessed contrasting merits like courage and compassion,’
Gülen responded that ‘so many different attributes in one person is a sign of
balance and perfection.’129 However, he quickly added that ‘these are only
apparent in God’s Messenger,’ and gave two examples of most human
beings having ‘the ultimate degree of their characteristics, but only for
certain qualities.’130 Importantly, the examples are Muhammad’s uncle
Hamza and the poet Hassan ibn Thabit, implying that men are considered
capable of having the ultimate degree not only of ‘bravery and courage,’ but
also ‘mercy, affection and compassion.’131 However, just as Gülen has long
since been engaged in what seems to be a project of self-formation informed
by the example of Muhammad, he is in effect encouraging men to approxi-
mate a similar balance and perfection in their lives.132
In contrast, Gülen nowhere encourages women to do the same. The above-
mentioned image of women in Turkey is used for the specific purpose of dis-
tinguishing ‘Turkish Islam’ from other versions of Islam, and his singular
encouragement of women to be courageous is very specific: rather than
seeking divorce, mothers should consider learning martial arts and physically
challenge husbands if subjected to domestic violence.133 Beyond this, Gülen’s
ideal woman possesses the ultimate degree of ‘mercy, affection and com-
passion’ only, and he stresses that women of this kind should be actively nur-
tured into being. For instance, he argues, ‘it is fundamental that girls be
brought up to be delicate like flowers and mild and affectionate educators
of children.’134 Elsewhere, Gülen emphasizes the importance of boys and
girls being educated in anticipation of their future responsibilities, and
argues that girls should be nurtured differently than boys with regard to
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manners, behavior and dressing.135 For the sake of women and men obtaining
feminine and masculine characteristics, respectively, girls should be brought
up in the warm and closed environment of their mothers, while boys
should be socialized with their fathers.
One possible reason for Gülen not encouraging also women to approxi-
mate balance and perfection in their lives can be that, just as he has made
it absolutely clear that they cannot be prophets due to their primordial
nature – arguing that ‘[a] Prophet must lead humanity in every aspect of its
social and religious life without a break,’ and that ‘[i]f men could have chil-
dren, they could not be Prophets either’136 – he thinks them incapable of
even approximating their perfection. A more practical reason can be that
Gülen’s conception of the ideal Islamic society is founded on particular con-
ceptions of the family and the home, which in turn, are founded on a purified
version of the compassionate, self-sacrificing and subordinate woman.
Women confined and constrained in the name of social order
Irrespective of his claim of not being concerned with politics, Gülen’s efforts
to revive Islam is aimed at establishing a society in which everybody and
everything (the state included) is oriented towards getting the approval of
God. In the Islamic society that Gülen has in mind, all individuals are (re)con-
nected with religion and traditional values, focus on spiritual development
and the hereafter, and ‘observe all their religious duties, including the second-
ary topics.’137 With regard to social organization, Gülen is very concerned
with order, and his ideal society implies a division of labor within a hierarch-
ical structure characterized by trust in and loyalty to authority. In this connec-
tion, he argues:
[a]ssigning qualified people to jobs or posts is a social trust and plays a signifi-
cant role in public administration and social order. Its abuse causes social dis-
order. There should be order at all social levels, for some are to be given
responsibilities by others.138
Furthermore, Gülen is very concerned with the need for strong organic ties
between social institutions. When stating that ‘people who want to guarantee
their future cannot be indifferent to how their children are being educated,’ he
goes on to argue that ‘[t]he family, school, environment, and mass media
should all cooperate to ensure the desired result. Opposing tendencies
among these vital institutions will subject young people to contradictory influ-
ences that will distract them and dissipate their energy.’139 In a rather totali-
tarian fashion, Gülen emphasizes the need for social institutions to propagate
a single and unified influence, and for a particular belief or worldview to be
‘inculcated’ in young people.140 To further avoid people being ‘distracted,’
Gülen argues that a whole series of preventive measures are needed. When
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interpreting an episode in which Muhammad turned his cousin’s face to
prevent his gaze being caught by passing women, he states:
[t]he meaning of this event is to cut off evil at its root. … That is, to set barriers
before vice and evil so as to prevent many individuals from being led astray and
families broken; to eliminate all the ways and means leading to rape, adultery,
murder, all sorts of immorality, perversions and corruptions; and to deter all
sins by prevention. … [to] close the gates to the forbidden, to prevent it in
advance, before it can happen.141
State authorities are ascribed a key role in preventing people from being ‘led
astray’ by prohibiting not only such specific things as prostitution, alcohol,
gambling, profiteering and adultery,142 but whatever can lead to ‘all sorts of
immorality, perversions and corruptions.’ However, discipline should also
be embedded in the social fabric through the principle of ‘commanding
right and forbidding wrong.’ According to Gülen, this divinely imposed
duty implies each Muslim constantly being on high alert to all possible
kinds of misdeeds and corruptions in society. Based on a general conception
of ‘units of a social structure [as] similar to organs of a body,’ he argues that
‘we… should not give any opportunity for even the smallest kind of things
forbidden by religion to take root and grow up in the interior,’143 because:
[w]hen there is a defect in one of the organs or, in other words, when individ-
uals begin to retrograde, when families are exposed to degeneration, when
women leave their homes, when streets get polluted, or when some defect
appears in the social structure, then pain and discomfort is felt in other
organs of the body connected to the initial problem.144
While Gülen seems to leave it to state authorities to forbid wrong with ‘the
hand,’ individual Muslims are obliged to forbid it with ‘the tongue’ and ‘the
heart.’ In other words, they are responsible for both ‘telling others that
adultery, robbery, profiteering and loan-sharking etc. are misdeeds,’ and ‘pre-
venting such misdeeds from penetrating into society… through [their] atti-
tudes and warnings.’145 Overall, Gülen argues that the declaration of ‘war
against any kind of illegitimate thing whether small-scale or large-scale’ is
central to making Islamic society distinct, and goes on to state that ‘we can
see the same pattern in almost all of the units of the Islamic structure’ in
the sense that ‘the individual is tied to the family, and the family is tied to
society.’146
With regard to women’s position in Gülen’s ideal society, earlier sections
made it clear that they for the main part should be confined to the domestic
sphere, where they are responsible for home-making and social breeding, and
subordinated to the authority of their husbands. Against the background of
the above discussion, it should also be clear why they must possess the ulti-
mate degree of ‘mercy, affection and compassion:’ If women develop other
characteristics, then they might both challenge the husband’s authority and
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destroy the patriarchal family, and seek equal public participation and destroy
the patriarchal social order. As noted by Gülen, if the balance between men
and women with their different natures and characteristics is upset, then
‘both the harmony of the family and the social order [will be] upset too.’147
It was exactly to avoid ‘complications’ in society that Gülen justified
cursing effeminate men and masculine women.148
Gülen’s approach to the Islamization of society has thus far been bottom-
up and centered on the transformation of individuals through education and
media. Although he certainly wishes to see a government in place that prac-
tices politics understood as ‘the art of managing a nation’s affairs in ways that
please God and people,’149 he has opposed Islam being overtly politicized on
the ground that it ‘will harm religion before it harms a government’s life,’150
and argued that ‘[i]f people want a good government, first they should
improve themselves intellectually, morally, and spiritually.’151 When promot-
ing a greater role for Islam in society, he has repeatedly argued that there is no
coercion in Islam,152 and employed a liberal discourse constituting people as
free to be, do and think what they want. In connection with the headscarf
issue, for instance, he argued, ‘let everyone do as they like, and no
limitations.’153
However, contrary to such rhetoric and claims about Gülen promoting a
‘liberal’ or ‘individualist’ approach to Islam, the individual is clearly subordi-
nated to the family, community and state in his thinking,154 and his commun-
alism incorporates a logic that can easily transgress teaching combined with
tolerance. With regard to teaching, Gülen has made it clear that ‘generations
lacking an ideal and tending towards almost all kinds of thoughts’ are in need
of ‘reconstruction… through indoctrination of faith, virtue, patience, love of
work, affection of their past, and aspiration of preparing for the future.’155
Furthermore, although Gülen certainly preaches the importance of tolerance,
he emphasizes two significant intra-communal limits. First, reflecting his view
that ‘[u]nity of feeling, thought, and culture are essential to a nation’s strength;
any disintegration of religious or moral unity weakens it,’ he argues that ‘no
one has the right to tolerate those views that separate people into camps and
destroy society.’156 Second, Gülen argues that ‘[a] society that shows tolerance
to misdeeds will sooner or later have to pay a price,’ and warns that ‘[t]he
history of nations demonstrates hundreds of examples of ruined societies
which initially sank into sins, then got stuck in ill-gotten deeds, and finally
perished.’157
Having a long-term approach to social change, Gülen has proved very
pragmatic in the shorter term. In this connection, Agai stresses how he
brings ‘social reality’ into the picture – a reality, that is, ‘which has to be
changed and requires compromises which are therefore Islamically justifi-
able.’158 However, what if social reality changes and compromises are no
longer required? In that case, what if neither ‘perfect representation,
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appropriate communication, excellent warnings and guidance’ nor practices
of social isolation work,159 and some members of society keep wishing to
‘do as they like, and no limitations’ – including women leaving their
homes, moving freely about in streets and marketplaces, dressing however
they want, mixing with unrelated men in public, and seeking paid work for
whatever reason? Given Gülen’s conception of society as a family writ
large,160 the following question can also be raised: If physical violence is
accepted as a method of ‘educating’ a disobedient wife in the case that
other methods do not work, then what will be the fate of women choosing
a lifestyle that does not conform to the regulatory norms built into Gülen’s
patriarchal conception of Islamic society?
Conclusion: Gülen as a champion of patriarchy
Contrary to claims about Gülen not being ‘another Muslim man of religion
telling women how they should dress and behave, and what is their
“proper” role in society,’161 his writings contain a very clear and conservative
message regarding what a woman should do: get married, give birth to and
educate many children, be loyal to the husband, live a chaste life, make the
home anew every day, cover up when/if venturing outside home, and be sub-
ordinate to men within the family and in society at large. All of this follows
from Gülen’s foundational conception of women being essentially different
from and inferior to men, and his tributes to women and talk about comple-
mentarity become but rhetorical veils for the gender inequality he prescribes.
Against the background of Gülen’s explicit championing of male domina-
tion, one cannot but be somewhat puzzled by several commentators having
concluded that he has ‘progressive’ views on women and gender relations.
In this connection, it can be initially pointed out that there is next to
nothing connecting Gülen’s views to the emphasis placed on ‘gender
justice’ by so-called progressive Muslims.162 Despite Gülen having proved
himself capable of contextualizing and opposing a practice such as polygamy,
overall he adopts a literal and conservative approach to Quranic verses and
hadiths concerning women and gender relations. Furthermore, contrary to
Andrea’s connecting Gülen positively to Islamic feminism,163 he does not
qualify for inclusion even in its most conservative strand.164 Not only are
his interpretations of the Islamic sources much too patriarchal, but
women’s rights as such have never been a central concern for Gülen, who
has engaged with it rather defensively either when denouncing feminism,
or responding to questions about women’s rights in Islam. Indeed, his
responses to such questions provide some clues as to why he has been por-
trayed as having progressive gender views not merely by sympathizers pro-
moting him vis-à-vis a Western audience, but also by some non-Turkish
scholars. While having easy access to Gülen’s interviews and select
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translations of his publications, such scholars are not necessarily in a position
to detect the ‘doublespeak’ that appears when these are considered next to
Gülen’s writings in Turkish.
The claim that Gülen has progressive gender views can be considered also
in relation to actual practices among Muslims. In this connection, while his
views can appear progressive in comparison with how Islam is practiced in
parts of the Muslim world, the most meaningful reference point is his
native country, Turkey. It is primarily in this context that some commentators
have pointed to a discrepancy between Gülen’s gender views and the conser-
vative practices of his followers. However, this discrepancy is more imaginary
than real, and follows from both the misrepresentation of Gülen’s gender
views, and the misconception of his position on issues such as the headscarf
as being something more than strategic pragmatism aimed at avoiding con-
frontation with the then-secular establishment in Turkey.165 Despite
Gülen’s claim that ‘Turkish Islam’ is non-patriarchal, Turkey has always
been a very patriarchal society,166 conservative interpretations of Islam have
constituted one source of this,167 and Gülen and his followers have been
and remain a complicit force of religion in this respect.
Beyond explicitly promoting women’s subordination, Gülen has aggressively
sought to undermine feminism by not merely depicting it as a ‘reactionary
movement’ that was ‘doomed to imbalance’ and ‘ended up in extremism’ by
‘being full of hatred towards men’ and ‘trying to establish [women’s] domi-
nance,’ but also constituting it as an evil force that ‘God curses’ due to how it
challenges his essentialist conception of what it means to be man and woman
respectively and, by extension, his patriarchal conception of a natural-divine div-
ision of labor between them.168 Furthermore, Gülen’s strategic pragmatism can
be argued to have contributed to undermine the struggle for women’s rights on
the part of the Muslim women’s movement in the 1990s – this, not least, with
regard to its fight against the headscarf ban in higher education.169 In the more
recent context of Turkey having made notable progress with regard to women’s
rights and gender equality – this, especially through post-2000 legislative
reforms aimed at integration with the European Union170 – the Gülen move-
ment has been actively involved in ‘the propagation of patriarchal religious
values sanctioning secondary roles for women through the state bureaucracy,
as well as through the educational system and civil society organisations.’171
All in all, Gülen and his community of followers are but a deeply conservative
force with respect to women’s rights and gender equality in Turkey.
Notes
1. Sunni orthodoxy in the Hanafi legal tradition and the Nakşibendi sufi order
were central to Gülen’s religious training, but he became increasingly influ-
enced by Said Nursi’s Quranic exegesis Risale-i Nur in the 1960s.
TURKISH STUDIES 269
2. Gülen, Towards the Lost Paradise, 18–19.
3. Çetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam.”
4. Knowlton, “Turk Who Leads.”
5. Yucel, “Fethullah Gülen,” 1.
6. Hansen, “Global Imam.”
7. While the exact source(s) of the fallout in question remain unclear, the conflict
between the government and the Gülen movement intensified significantly
with the launching of a fraud and corruption investigation with links to four
ministers in December 2013. The National Security Council designated the
Gülen movement as a “terrorist organization” in May 2016, and Gülen and
his followers are accused of being behind the failed coup d’état of 15 July 2016.
8. Turam, Between Islam and the State, 114ff.
9. Yavuz, “Gülen Movement,” 29.
10. Kurtz, “Gülen’s Paradox,” 380.
11. Çelik, “Gülen Movement,” 51.
12. Aras and Caha, “Fethullah Gulen,” 33.
13. Andrea, “Women and Their Rights,” 150, 157.
14. Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy, 19ff.
15. Andrea, “Women and Their Rights,” 146. Andrea is Celia Jacobs Endowed Pro-
fessor in British Literature at the University of Texas, San Antonio. Her fields of
specialization include “women’s studies”, “interactions between Islam and the
West in the early modern period”, and “contemporary women’s writings
from the Islamic world” (http://colfa.utsa.edu/english/andrea.html; accessed
August 5, 2016).
16. Ibid., 148. Beyond Gülen’s webpage, Andrea draws on a promotion book pub-
lished by the Gülen movement (Ünal and Williams, Advocate of Dialogue).
17. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 62–4.
18. Andrea, “Women and Their Rights,” 148–9.
19. Ibid., 156.
20. Gülen, “Interview with Fethullah Gülen,” 464.
21. Sevindi, “Minutes with Fethullah Gülen.”
22. Ibid.
23. Ünal and Williams, Advocate of Dialogue, 63.
24. Sevindi, “Minutes with Fethullah Gülen.”
25. Andrea, “Women and Their Rights,” 154.
26. Gülen, “Women Confined and Mistreated.”
27. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
28. Sevindi, Contemporary Islamic Conversations, 66.
29. Andrea, “Women and Their Rights,” 150.
30. Ibid., 152.
31. Ibid., 154.
32. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
33. Andrea, “Women and Their Rights,” 150, 157.
34. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 62, 64.
35. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 1: 123.
36. Gülen, “What Are Your Ideas.”
37. Gülen, “What Would You Say”; Gülen, “Women Confined and Mistreated.”
38. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
39. Gülen, “What Are Your Ideas.”
40. Gülen, “What Would You Say.”
270 T. FOUGNER
41. Gülen, Speech and Power, 47.
42. Gülen, Ölümsüzlük iksiri, 57.
43. Gülen, Speech and Power, 48.
44. Gülen, “Tribute to Mothers.”
45. Gülen, “What Would You Say.”
46. Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 3, 136.
47. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 62, 64.
48. Gülen, Speech and Power, 47.
49. Ibid., 47–9.
50. Gülen, “Tribute to Mothers.”
51. Gülen, Speech and Power, 50.
52. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 1: 87–8.
53. Gülen, Ölçü veya yoldaki ışıklar, 75.
54. Ibid., 171; Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 62, 64.
55. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 171.
56. Gülen, Varlığın metafizik boyutu, 347.
57. Gülen, Ölümsüzlük iksiri, 49.
58. Gülen, Messenger of God, 407.
59. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 171.
60. Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 3, 96–7.
61. Andrea, “Women and Their Rigihts,” 149.
62. Gülen, Cemre beklentisi, 117.
63. Gülen, Varlığın metafizik boyutu, 353.
64. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 2: 116.
65. Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 3, 136–7.
66. Ibid.; see Gülen, “Kız çocuklariyla alâkalı.”
67. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 41; Gülen, Questions and Answers, 2: 114.
68. Gülen, Ölçü veya yoldaki ışıklar, 155; Gülen, Çekirdekten çınara, 193.
69. Gülen, “Cinsiyet mevzuu.”
70. Gülen, Essentials of Islamic Faith, 242.
71. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 1: 87.
72. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 2: 114.
73. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 41.
74. Gülen, “What Would You Say.”
75. Gülen, “Aile ve önemi.”
76. Ibid.
77. Gülen, Ölümsüzlük iksiri, 52.
78. Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 3, 135–6.
79. Ibid., 136.
80. Gülen, Ölümsüzlük iksiri, 52.
81. Ibid.
82. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 149–51.
83. Gülen, Messenger of God, 162.
84. Ibid., 74.
85. Ibid.
86. Gülen, “Peygamberimiz ve söz.”
87. Gülen, Ölçü veya yoldaki ışıklar, 73.
88. Ahmed, Women and Gender, 34.
89. Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 2, 165ff.
90. Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 3, 130.
TURKISH STUDIES 271
91. Ibid., 130–2.
92. Kurucan, “Intra-Family Violence.”
93. Eissa, “Constructing the Notion.”
94. Nursi, Words, 761.
95. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 51.
96. Gülen, Vuslat muştusu, 135.
97. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
98. Gülen, “Women Confined and Mistreated.”
99. Gülen, Fasıldan fasıla 1, 109.
100. Gülen, Çekirdekten çınara, 53–4.
101. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
102. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 1: 123.
103. Ibid.
104. Gülen, “What Are Your Ideas.”
105. Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 2, 47.
106. Gülen, “What Would You Say.”
107. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
108. Ibid.
109. Gülen, “Women Confined and Mistreated.”
110. Gülen, “What Would You Say.”
111. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
112. Young, “Logic of Masculinist Protection.”
113. Gülen, Ölçü veya yoldaki ışıklar, 72, 74.
114. Gülen, “Women Confined and Mistreated.”
115. Gülen, Vuslat muştusu, 135.
116. Gülen, “Kız çocuklariyla alâkalı.”
117. Gülen, Ölümsüzlük iksiri, 53.
118. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
119. Gülen, “What Are Your Ideas.”
120. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
121. This links up with the scientific debate on human traits and behaviour being
influenced by biological and/or environmental factors, which regarding
gender concerns “the relative importance of genetics, anatomy, and physiology
(nature) as compared with physical environment, socialization, and social
structure (nurture) in producing gender difference (or the appearance of
gender difference).” Cohan, “Nature/Nurture Debate”, 601. However, the
point here is not to engage this debate as such, but rather to use the nature-
nurture distinction to tease out tensions within Gülen’s gender thoughts.
122. Sevindi, Contemporary Islamic Conversations, 65.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., 72. While Gülen is a key proponent of Islam in Turkey being different
from and superior to Islam elsewhere, the idea of a distinct “Turkish Islam”
that is liberal, pluralist and modern goes beyond this and is claimed to be
rooted historically in the influence of Hanafi jurisprudence, Maturidi theology
and Sufi mysticism, as well as in the relationship that developed between the
state and Islam in the late-Ottoman Empire. Uğur, “Intellectual Roots of
‘Turkish Islam’”; Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism”.
125. Gülen, “Kız çocuklariyla alâkalı.”
126. Ibid.
127. Gülen, Messenger of God, xxiii–iv.
272 T. FOUGNER
128. Gülen, “Compassion.”
129. Gülen, “Questions and Answers.”
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. In this connection, it has been argued that “Gülen men demonstrate alternative
masculinities… than is ‘the norm’ in Turkey”. Pandya, “Creating Peace on
Earth”, 110. In contrast to the macho “Gazi warrior archetype [of] the powerful,
heroic male warrior, who fought to spread Islam”, Gülen’s masculinity has been
seen to evoke “Sufi sainthood” and include “concepts that have typically been
stereotyped as feminine, such as ‘love, submission, and subservience’”, and
Gülen is treated by his male followers as an “ideal man” to be imitated.
Pandya, “Gazi Warrior Vs. Sufi Mystic”, 46, 53, 56; Karatop, “New Muslim
Male Subjectivities”, 45. For a general discussion on Islamic and Muslim mas-
culinities, see Aslam, Gender-Based Explosions, 90–143.
133. Kurucan, “Intra-Family Violence.”
134. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 40.
135. Gülen, “Kız çocuklariyla alâkalı.”
136. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 1: 123 (my italics). For Gülen, the prophet-
related problem of “having children” refers not merely to the ability to give
birth as such, but to the menstrual period (which in the Turkish version is
said to last and make women “deficient” for 15 days each month), the “necess-
ary confinement before and after childbirths”, and the child-rearing responsi-
bilities ascribed to women. Ibid.; Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 2, 47–8.
137. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
138. Gülen, Messenger of God, 74.
139. Gülen, Towards a Global Civilization, 206.
140. Gülen, Essentials of Islamic Faith, 132.
141. Gülen, Questions and Answers, 2: 67–8.
142. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 70.




147. Gülen, Speech and Power, 50.
148. Gülen, “Kız çocuklariyla alâkalı.”
149. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 87.
150. Ünal and Williams, Advocate of Dialogue, 36.
151. Ibid., 169.
152. Ibid., 63ff.
153. Gülen, “Women’s Rights in Islam.”
154. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity, 201.
155. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 59.
156. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 88–9.
157. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 64.
158. Agai, “Islam and Education,” 162.
159. Gülen, Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız, 72.
160. Gülen, Pearls of Wisdom, 92.
161. Ünal and Williams, Advocate of Dialogue, v.
162. Safi, Progressive Muslims.
163. Andrea, “Women and Their Rights,” 149.
TURKISH STUDIES 273
164. Salah, “From Ijtihad to Gender Jihad,” 32–5.
165. Contrary to claims quoted in the introduction, some studies on women and
gender relations within the Gülen movement indicate that certain segments
(especially outside of Turkey) might actually have more progressive gender
views than Gülen. Curtis, “Among the Heavenly Branches”; Pandya, “Creating
Peace on Earth.”
166. Arat, Patriarchal Paradox, 22–46.
167. Müftüler-Bac, “Turkish Women’s Predicament.”
168. Gülen, “Women Confined and Mistreated”; Gülen, Ölumsüzlük İksiri, 46–7;
Gülen, Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 3, 136–7; Gülen, Fasıldan Fasıla 2, 231.
169. Turam, Islam and the State, 126–30.
170. Fougner and Kurtoğlu, “Gender Policy.”
171. Arat, “Religion, Politics and Gender,” 869–70.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Burçak Dölek for research assistance, and Jeremy Salt and three
anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of the article. A special thank
goes to Gözde Turan, who not only helped with several aspects of the research (trans-
lations included), but also was my main conversation partner when conducting it.
Finally, I thank the students taking my course ‘Gender in International Relations’
at Bilkent University, as this provided the context for me initially becoming curious
about Gülen’s gender views.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
Tore Fougner is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at
Bilkent University (Turkey). His research interests include various aspects of inter-
national political economy, transnational relations, non-human animals in world
politics, and gender equality and women’s rights.
Bibliography
Agai, Bekim. “Islam and Education in Secular Turkey: State Policies and the
Emergence of the Fethullah Gülen Group.” In Schooling Islam: The Culture and
Politics of Modern Muslim Education, edited by Robert W. Hefner and
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 149–171. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2007.
Ahmed, Leila.Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.
Andrea, Bernadette. “Women and Their Rights: Fethullah Gülen’s Gloss on Lady
Montagu’s ‘Embassy’ to the Ottoman Empire.” In Muslim Citizens of the
Globalized World, edited by Robert A. Hunt and Yüksel A. Aslandoğan, 145–
164. Somerset: Light, 2006.
274 T. FOUGNER
Aras, Bulent, and Omer Caha. “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’
Movement.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4, no. 4 (2000): 30–42.
Arat, Yeşim. The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicians in Turkey. Rutherford:
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989.
Arat, Yeşim. “Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications of a
Democratic Paradox.” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 6 (2010): 869–884. doi:10.
1080/01436597.2010.502712
Aslam, Maleeha. Gender-based Explosions: The Nexus between Muslim Masculinities,
Jihadist Islamism and Terrorism. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2012.
Çelik, Gürkan. “The Gülen Movement: Building Social Cohesion through Dialogue
and Education.” PhD diss., Tilburg University, 2008.
Çetinsaya, Gökhan. “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on
the Roots of ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ in Modern Turkish Political Thought.”
The Muslim World 89, no. 3/4 (1999): 350–376. doi:10.1111/j.1478-1913.1999.
tb02753.x
Cohan, Mark. “Nature/Nurture Debate.” In Encyclopedia of Gender and Society,
edited by Jodi O’Brien, 601–604. London: Sage, 2009.
Curtis, Maria. “Among the Heavenly Branches: Leadership and Authority among
Women in the Gülen Hizmet Movement.” In The Gülen Hizmet Movement:
Circumspect Activism in Faith-Based Reform, edited by Tamer Balcı and
Christopher L. Miller, 119–154. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012.
Eissa, Dahlia. Constructing the Notion of Male Superiority over Women in Islam: The
Influence of Sex and Gender Stereotyping in the Interpretationo of the Qur’an and
the Implications for A Modernist Exegesis of Rights. WLUML Occasional Paper
No. 11. Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 1999. http://www.wluml.org/sites/
wluml.org/files/import/english/pubs/pdf/occpaper/OCP-11.pdf.
Fougner, Tore, and Ayça Kurtoğlu. “Gender Policy: A Case of Instrumental
Europeanization?” In The Europeanization of Turkish Public Policies: A
Scorecard, edited by Aylin Güney and Ali Tekin, 143–163. London: Routledge,
2015.




Gülen, M. Fethullah. Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 2 [Questions this Modern Age Puts to
Islam 2]. Istanbul: Nil, 2011 (1st ed. 1989).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Asrın getirdiği tereddütler 3 [Questions this Modern Age Puts to
Islam 3]. Istanbul: Nil, 2012 (1st ed. 1990).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Çekirdekten çınara (bir başka açıdan ailede eğitim) [From Seed
to Cedar (Education in the Family from a Different Perspective)]. Istanbul: Nil,
2011 (1st ed. 2002).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Cemre beklentisi [Awaiting Spring]. Istanbul: Nil, 2011.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “Cinsiyet mevzuu” [On the Issue of (Biological) Sex]. Sızıntı, no.
40 (1982). http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular/ayrinti/genclik-gencligin-
problemleri-mayis-1982.html.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “Compassion.” Fountain Magazine no. 63 (2008). http://www.
fountainmagazine.com/Issue/detail/Compassion-898.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Enginliğiyle bizim dünyamız [Our World with Its Generosity].
Istanbul: Nil, 2011 (1st ed. 2009).
TURKISH STUDIES 275
Gülen, M. Fethullah. The Essentials of the Islamic Faith. Clifton: Tughra, 2010 (1st ed.
2000).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Fasıldan fasıla 1 [From Time to Time 1]. Izmir: Nil, 1995.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Fasıldan fasıla 2 [From Time to Time 2]. Izmir: Nil, 1997.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “An Interview with Fethullah Gülen.” The Muslim World 95, no.
3 (2005): 447–467. doi:10.1111/j.1478-1913.2005.00104.x
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “Kız çocuklariyla alâkalı küçük bir mütalaa” [A Brief Study of
Daughters]. Sızıntı, no. 41 (1982). http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular/ayrinti/
genclik-gencligin-problemleri-haziran-1982.html.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. The Messenger of God, Muhammad: An Analysis of the Prophet’s
Life. Somerset: Light, 2005.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Ölçü veya yoldaki ışıklar [Criteria or Lights of the Way].
Istanbul: Nil, 2011 (1st ed. 2000).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Ölümsüzlük iksiri [Potion of Immorality]. Istanbul: Nil, 2011
(1st ed. 2007).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Pearls of Wisdom. Somerset: Light, 2005 (1st ed. 2000).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “Peygamberimiz ve söz – 2” [The Prophet and HisWord – 2]. Yeni
Ümit, no. 13 (1991). http://www.yeniumit.com.tr/konular/detay/peygamberimiz-ve-
soz--2.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “Questions and Answers.” Fountain Magazine no. 57 (2007).
http://www.fountainmagazine.com/Issue/detail/Questions-and-Answers.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Questions and Answers About Islam, Vol. 1. Somerset: Tughra,
2011.
Gülen, M. Fethullah.Questions and Answers About Islam, Vol. 2. Somerset: Tughra, 2011.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Speech and Power of Expression: On Language, Esthetics, and
Belief. Somerset: Tughra, 2011.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Towards a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance. Somerset:
Light, 2004.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Towards the Lost Paradise. London: Truestar, 1996.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “A Tribute to Mothers.” Fountain Magazine no. 50 (2005).
http://www.fountainmagazine.com/Issue/detail/A-Tribute-to-Mothers.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Varlığın metafizik boyutu [The Metaphysical Dimension of
Existence]. Istanbul: Nil, 2011 (1st ed. 1998).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. Vuslat muştusu [Tidings of Reunion]. Istanbul: Nil, 2011 (1st ed.
2008).
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “What Are Your Ideas About Women’s Rights?” Fountain
Magazine no. 38 (2002). http://www.fountainmagazine.com/Issue/detail/What-
are-your-ideas-about-womens-rights.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “What Would You Say About the Equality of Men and
Women?” Fountain Magazine no. 44 (2003). http://www.fountainmagazine.com/
Issue/detail/What-would-you-say-about-the-equality-of-men-and-women.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “Women Confined and Mistreated.” Fountain Magazine no. 63
(2008). http://www.fountainmagazine.com/Issue/detail/Women-Confined-and-
Mistreated.
Gülen, M. Fethullah. “Women’s Rights in Islam.” 2005. http://fgulen.com/en/home/
1329-fgulen-com-english/press/mehmet-gundems-interview-in-milliyet-daily/
25338-womens-rights-in-islam.




Karatop, İbrahim Tevfik. “New Muslim Masculinities: Masculinities in the Hizmet
Movement.” MA diss., Sabancı University, 2011.
Knowlton, Brian. “Turk Who Leads a Movement Has Advocates and Critics.”
New York Times, June 11, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/us/12iht-
gulen.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
Kurtz, Lester R. “Gülen’s Paradox: Combining Commitment and Tolerance.” The
Muslim World 95, no. 3 (2005): 373–384. doi:10.1111/j.1478-1913.2005.00100.x
Kurucan, Ahmet. “Intra-family Violence and Islam.” Today’s Zaman, Oct.ober28,
2009. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-157060-intra-family-violence-and-
islam-by-ahmet-kurucan-.html.
Mardin, Şerif. “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity,
Rupture and Reconstruction in Operational Codes.” Turkish Studies 6, no. 2
(2005): 145–165. doi:10.1080/14683840500119478
Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. “Turkish Women’s Predicament.” Women’s Studies
International Forum 22, no. 3 (1999): 303–315. doi:10.1016/S0277-5395(99)00029-1
Nursi, Bediuzzaman Sadi. The Words: On the Nature and Purposes of Man, Life, and
All Things. Rev. ed. Istanbul: Sözler, 2004.
Pandya, Sophia. “Creating Peace on Earth through Hicret (Migration): Women Gülen
Followers in America.” In The Gülen Hizmet Movement and Its Transnational
Activities: Case Studies of Altruistic Activism in Contemporary Islam, edited by
Sophia Pandya and Nancy Gallagher, 97–116. Boca Raton: BrownWalker, 2012.
Pandya, Sophia. “Gazi Warrior Vs Sufi Mystic: Turkey’s Erdoğan-Gülen Breakup.”
Critical Muslim 16 (2015): 45–62.
Safi, Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism. Oxford:
Oneworld, 2003.
Salah, Hoda. “From Ijtihad to Gender Jihad: Islamic Feminists between Regional
Activism and Transnationalism.” In Diversity and Female Political Participation:
Views on and from the Arab World, edited by Claudia Derichs, 27–46. Berlin:
Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2010.
Sevindi, Nevval. Contemporary Islamic Conversations: M. Fethullah Gülen on Turkey,
Islam, and the West. New York: State University of New York Press, 2008.
Sevindi, Nevval. “The Minutes with Fethullah Gülen in New York.” Yeni Yuzyil, July
20–29, 1997. http://www.nevvalsevindi.com/yeni/category/z-en/page/5.
Turam, Berna. Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2007.
Uğur, Etga. “Intellectual Roots of ‘Turkish Islam’ and Approaches to the ‘Turkish
Model’.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 24, no. 2 (2004): 327–345. doi:10.
1080/1360200042000296690
Ünal, Ali, and Alphonse Williams. Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gülen. Fairfax:
Fountain, 2002.
Walby, Sylvia. Theorizing Patriarchy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
Yavuz, M. Hakan. “The Gülen Movement: The Turkish Puritans.” In Turkish Islam
and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and
John L. Esposito, 19–47. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003.
Yavuz, M. Hakan. Islamic Political Identity in Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003.
Young, Iris Marion. “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current
Security State.” Signs 29, no. 1 (2003): 1–25. doi:10.1086/375708
Yucel, Salih. “Fethullah Gülen: Spiritual Leader in a Global Islamic Context.” Journal
of Religion and Society 12 (2010): 1–19.
TURKISH STUDIES 277
